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For much of the past two decades, controversy has rocked America’s universities and cultural 
institutions.  Within the arts, well-publicized battles over controversial photographs, installations 
and performance pieces  --- from the Robert Mapplethorpe controversy to the Brooklyn 
Museum affair --- pitted defenders of modernism and artistic freedom against champions of 
traditional values and public decorum.
1   Within higher education, universities were castigated as 
preserves of “political correctness,” dominated by “tenured radicals” who sought to replace 
traditional western culture with an ill-formed goulash reflecting the preferences and identities of a 
broad array of ethnic, racial, gender and lifestyle special-interest groups.
2 
  Many have noted that the quality of this debate has not been outstanding.
3   Some 
influential critics have relied less on reasoned argument than on passionate accounts (the 
specifics of which often turned out to be distorted) of lurid cases of artistic license or political 
excess.  Defenders of cultural institutions have often responded piecemeal to the particulars of 
specific attacks, or else have dispensed abstract pieties about artistic or academic freedom that 
fail to come to grips with critics’ charges. 
  Yet if the rhetoric has been superficial the issues are fundamental.  For conflicts over 
education and the arts bear directly upon the nature of cultural authority, especially religious and 
professional authority, in American democracy; upon the receptivity of the native-born to the 
new immigration of the late twentieth century; and upon the mode and manner of cultural repro-
duction during an era in which all signs indicate that traditional bases of cultural authority have 
weakened as cultural diversity has increased.  How the widely perceived tension between 
greater diversity and weakened authority is resolved --- whether it produces a “twilight of 
common dreams” (as Todd Gitlin put it) illuminated only by the blaze of intergroup conflict, or 
an efflorescent democratic culture --- will depend on the shape and strength of our institutions DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---2--- 
 
and on how well we master the “arts of democracy” with which this book is concerned.
4 
  In this chapter we review the results of a 1993 survey of a statistically representative 
cross-section of non-institutionalized U.S. adults, to see what those outside the theatre of battle 
make of the issues around which controversy has raged.  We conclude that mass opinion is 
more moderate and in many ways more sophisticated than public rhetoric.  If published ac-
counts of controversy have often depicted a two-sided battle between  radical multiculturalists 
and tradition-minded conservatives, the structure of public sentiments is more nuanced in at least 
three ways.  First, attitudes towards cultural authority and cultural diversity are not polarized: 
Most opinions hew to the center of the ideological spectrum.  Second, attitudes towards cultural 
authority do not follow in lock step from attitudes towards cultural diversity: supporters of 
multiculturalism do not have much more or less faith in cultural elites than their opponents.  
Third, and most important, respect for the value of high culture --- specifically modern art and 
the classics of western literature --- is not associated with the devaluation of cultural diversity: 
indeed, people who value high culture are somewhat more likely than others to endorse some 
multicultural educational reforms. 
The Arts and Education as Battlegrounds 
Many observers, including some social scientists, have argued that the debates over education 
and the arts are part of a broader “culture war” that pits religious conservatives or 
“traditionalists,” who believe in God-given moral imperatives, against secular progressivists, 
who espouse moral relativism and seek to exclude religion from public life.
5  In this view, 
hostility to modern art, a reluctance to open the traditional canon to new  works, support for 
English-only language policies, and distrust of the judgment of (secular) professionals all follow 
from the traditionalist worldview.  By contrast, support for expanding the canon and or bilingual DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---3--- 
 
education, appreciation of modern and postmodern art, and respect for the cultural authority of 
professors and curators are part of the progressivist world view.    
  Studies of public opinion on other issues (including our own) have found little support 
for the existence of a “culture war,” if by that we mean that Americans are strongly divided on 
many issues along progressivist and traditionalist lines.  The public’s attitudes on most social 
issues gravitate to the center; most people derive their attitudes on most issues from experience 
or specific considerations, rather than broad ideological postures; and most social attitudes – 
abortion being the great exception -- actually became less rather than more polarized during the 
last quarter of the 20
th century.
6 
  Nonetheless, between 1990 and 1995, many journalists came to the opposite con-
clusion, convincing themselves that the United States was in the throes of a full-fledged culture 
war.  Indeed, the term “culture war,” which appeared in the press only rarely during the 1980s, 
was employed with escalating frequency during the first half of the 1990s.  Our review of 
newspapers on the Nexis data base indicated that whereas the phrase appeared in two or three 
articles per month between January 1990 and late 1991, references rose steadily thereafter to 
approximately fifty (distinct) articles per month by late 1994 and early 1995. 
7   Whether or not 
social and cultural conflict actually increased in the United States during this period, attentive 
newspaper readers would certainly have concluded that it had. 
  The arts and education, especially higher education, were among the most visible arenas 
in which the cultural contests of the 1980s and 1990s were fought.  Indeed, one might say that 
these institutions were the loci classici of the cultural politics that sprang into public 
consciousness with conservative attacks on campus “political correctness” and the National En-
dowment for the Arts in the late 1980s.  More than one third of all references to “culture war” 
in the U.S. press between 1990 and 1993 (as these were recorded in the Nexis system) were DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---4--- 
 
about higher education and the high-culture arts.  (Many more concerned the popular media.)  
No less a belligerent than William Bennett, President Reagan’s Chair of the National 
Endowment for the Humanities, described the “culture war” as a battle “about music, art, 
poetry, literature, television programming, and movies; the modes of expression and 
conversation, official and unofficial, that express who and what we are, what we believe, and 
how we act.”
8 
  Part of the visibility and salience of attacks on universities and arts institutions reflected 
their sponsorship:  Several conservative foundations supported a network of academic associat-
ions, publishing houses, and student groups that promoted the attack on the universities.
9  Many 
conservative Christian social-movement groups, as well as some Republican politicians, found it 
convenient to highlight government grants to “obscene” or “sacrilegious” artists in fund-raising 
appeals and campaign speeches.
10  Part of the attention lavished upon conflicts in universities 
and the arts is explicable by their immediacy: photographs with in-your-face sexual or religious 
imagery and lurid (if rarely entirely accurate) tales of innocent college students crucified at the 
alter of “political correctness” have the capacity to engender shock and dismay. 
  In any case, campus controversies and arts-funding scandals received attention 
disproportionate to their number or significance, as isolated events were taken as emblematic of 
broad cultural trends.  With respect to the arts, the fact that only a dozen or so grants out of 
tens of thousands by public arts agencies were suitable for condemnation  by those agencies’ 
adversaries is at least as remarkable --- and, if one takes it as a sign of timidity, at least as 
sobering --- as the fact that those grants were made at all.   
  In the field of higher education, reports of the trashing of western civilization turned out 
to represent a fevered reaction to modest reforms.  As Bryson (1999) concluded from case 
studies of four very different English Departments, campuses themselves (with some well DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---5--- 
 
publicized exceptions) were the calm eyes at the center of the canon-war hurricane.  Elite de-
partments turned disagreements into spirited intellectual contests among entrepreneurial 
professors who, whatever the outcome, remained free to teach what they pleased.  In non-elite 
departments, curricular decisions were dictated by the realities of university distribution require-
ments, what textbook publishers offered, and student preferences --- faculty are happy to teach 
nearly any decent book if only their students will read it --- leaving little time or occasion for 
philosophical contention.
11   
  Bryson’s results are consistent with those of a 1990 survey of English-Department fac-
ulty conducted by the Modern Language Association.  That study found that although works by 
women and African-American authors were included in modern literature courses (courses in 
pre-modern literature were largely unchanged) such additions provided modest leavening to 
syllabi dominated by canonical figures.  And while just over half of the departments had 
introduced courses on women writers or writers of color, almost 80 percent offered specialized 
courses on Shakespeare; and the typical institution offered as many sections of the latter as 
sections in all of the courses on women and authors of color combined.
12  
Public Opinion and the Arts of Democracy 
Even if the press exaggerated the magnitude of change and the severity of conflict, such reports 
could have influenced markedly Americans' perceptions.  Our purpose here is to explore the 
extent to which public battles over the arts and higher education reflected (or shaped) the 
underlying structure of American sentiments, as captured by a sample survey of more than 
1,400 noninstitutionalized Americans aged 18 and over.  These men and women were 
interviewed in their homes in spring of 1993, a period of relative calm before the escalation of 
culture-war rhetoric that preceded the 1994 mid-term elections.  DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---6--- 
 
  It may be worth asking both why we should be interested in public opinion, and whether 
surveys are capable of measuring it.  As to the first, measuring public opinion is a central rituals 
of American democracy.  This reliance on attitude surveys to characterize the public mind is a 
relatively novel and highly consequential aspect of contemporary politics.  Whereas “public 
opinion” in other epochs was constituted in salons, coffee shops, or public squares, today it 
reflects specific practices of survey design and implementation, the results of which insert 
themselves as social facts into political discourse.  Quite apart from whether the percentage of 
the public that favors or opposes bilingual education or government grants to artists reflects 
“true” attitudes (in so far as such things can be said to exist), such a result, once reported in the 
press, serves to structure and constrain public debate.
13 
  Because of this, the results of attitude surveys have significant political implications for 
both cultural democrats and elitists.  If one believes that the public has legitimate claim on the 
policies of universities or nonprofit arts institutions, then the weight one gives critical voices will 
depend, to some extent at least, on whether their views represent those of the constituencies for 
whom they claim to speak.  If one believes that universities and cultural institutions should be 
unbuffetted by fashions that sway the broader culture, then one must understand public opinion 
in order to fend off the forces of philistinism.   
  But do surveys really tell us what people think?  Most polls invite respondents to affirm 
or reject an opinion (declared or embedded in a question) that the survey’s authors have 
constructed.  An affirmation does not mean that the respondent fully accepts the position 
endorsed, only that affirmation approximates his or her view more closely than rejection.  
Moreover, as survey experts are quick to point, many people construct opinions on the spot to 
oblige pollsters.  If people have not thought much about an issue, their responses may be driven 
by details of question wording.  If they have thought a lot about it, their opinions may be too DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---7--- 
 
complex and ambivalent to be captured in brief precoded responses.
14     
  Even so, attitude surveys can teach us a lot about the direction and structure of people’s 
views, albeit not the specifics of what they believe.  For one thing, surveys are excellent 
inoculants against partisan claims to represent the masses and against the natural tendency to 
infer the distribution of public sentiments from their visible expression in collective action and 
talk-show debate.  Equally important, inspecting the relationship between different items in an 
attitude survey --- the extent to which people who take a certain stand on one issue take a 
predictable position on a second --- permits inference about the way that people reason about 
matters of controversy.  Analyzing the ways in which responses to opinion surveys fit together 
helps us recover the narratives that structure the opinions of the public or of particular groups 
within it.  Such narratives are often different and less ideological than those that animate public 
speeches and newspaper editorials.  In other words, attitude surveys cannot reveal the public 
mind in stark clarity, but they dispel illusions and offer intriguing hints about the ways that people 
understand their world. 
  Specifically, we believe that data from the 1993 General Social Survey can help us 
understand Americans’ views of cultural authority and cultural diversity.  By “cultural diversity,” 
we refer to heterogeneity with respect to racial and ethnic groups understood to be  “min-
orities”: in the United States, cultural diversity ordinarily refers to communities of color, including 
persons of Asian, African, Latin American, and Native American Indian descent.  Debates 
about cultural diversity address the inclusiveness of institutions as manifested by the back-
grounds of persons (faculty or students, curators or actors), of cultural objects (books in a 
curriculum, paintings in galleries), or of languages (as in controversies over bilingual education in 
the schools).    
  By "cultural authority" we refer to acknowledged legitimate authority of specialized elites DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---8--- 
 
to evaluate objects, ideas or actions in specific spheres of collective responsibility.  Societies 
vary in the extent to which such authority is vested in anyone at all, in the degree of consensus 
about what kind of people possess it, in the extent to which authority in different domains is 
spread amongst many elites or concentrated in one or a few, and in the extent to which its 
exercise is embedded in the state, in private organizations, or in more general discursive 
formations.   
  Compared to other wealthy nations, the United States’s pattern of cultural authority has 
been unusual in at least two ways: first, it has been relatively weak and strongly contested in the 
domain of arts and letters; and, second, at least since the Progressive era, cultural authority has 
been concentrated in densely connected networks based in universities and the professions.
15 
  Conflicts over the arts and education often challenge established modes of cultural 
authority from several directions.  Some proponents of “diversity” castigate those who hold 
cultural authority for maintaining cultural hierarchies that arbitrarily exclude work by nonwhite or 
female artists, authors, scholars and musicians.  At the same time, attacks on modernist (and 
postmodern) art, and on “political correctness” (sometimes a code word for attention to 
“cultural diversity”) in the universities have often entailed a rejection of professional authority, an 
antinomian appeal to the “common sense” of the American public that works, in so far as it 
does, precisely because cultural authority (in the arts and humanities) has never been very ef-
fectively established.    
  Of course, the most influential of these critics (for example, Hilton Kramer, Allan 
Bloom, William Bennett) are no strangers to universities and other cultural institutions 
themselves: Such critics often speak on behalf of the traditional canon and in the name of a no-
longer dominant view of the humanities, drawing upon their own professional credentials to 
underscore their arguments.  Thus combatants in cultural conflict construct both their DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---9--- 
 
protagonists and villains – culturally diverse groups, “great” art or literature, the academic 
“establishment,” and so on --- in multiple and sometimes inconsistent registers.  Indeed, debates 
over education and the arts are complicated, to say the least, because they present themselves 
both as conflicts within a professorial and intellectual elite, in which each side claims the mantle 
of professional expertise, and as populist uprisings against secular cultural authority of any 
kind.
16 
  Our study had three objectives. We wanted to find out if attitudes towards cultural 
authority and cultural diversity in the arts and education were as polarized as the rhetoric sug-
gested.  We wanted to know if the general public’s opinions on the various issues that had 
become implicated in public debates cohered into the clusters of interlinked opinions marked 
out by conservative critics and their liberal opponents.  Finally, in so far as we identified lines of 
cleavage, we were eager to learn how Americans of different genders, races, ages, and levels of 
educational attainment differed in their views. 
Are attitudes polarized? 
The 1993 General Social Survey contained eight questions designed to tap respondents’ views 
on these conflicts (see Table 1 for exact wording).
17   In each case, respondents were presented 
with a statement and asked to indicate whether they agreed, agreed strongly, disagreed, or 
disagreed strongly with the sentiments it expressed.   The items tapped attitudes towards the 
role of the classics in high school and college curricula, the capacity of “great books” to 
transcend their cultural origins, bilingual education in the public schools, reform of the canon to 
include literature by women and people of color at the expense of traditional works by white 
men, whether excellence can be found in popular and folk culture as well as the fine arts, 
whether teachers and professors can be trusted to decide what students should read, and DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---10--- 
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Table 1: General Social Survey Attitude Items  
Interviewers presented each of the following statements to the respondents in turn, asking 
respondents to indicate, for each, “whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly 
disagree with” the statement.  Bracketed expressions are mnemonic references provided by the 
survey organization. These are used in some subsequent tables. 
 
***I trust the judgment of the teachers and professors who decide what high school and college 
students should be reading.  
 
*** High schools and colleges make students spend too much time reading “classics” that have 
little relevance in today’s world.  
 
*** The great books are universal in their appeal: There is no "white literature," "black literature," or 
"Asian literature," there is only human literature.  
 
***It is better for everyone is English is the only language used in the public schools. 
 
*** It is a shame when traditional American literature is ignored while other works are promoted 
because they are by women or by members of minority groups.  
 
*** Only a few people have the knowledge and ability to judge excellence in the arts. 
 
*** Modern painting is just slapped on: a child could do it. 
 
*** Artistic excellence can be found in popular and folk culture just as much as in the fine arts. DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---12--- 
 
quality in the arts.   In some cases, the statements were phrased tendentiously in order to 
provoke varied reactions. 
  Given that these topics are hardly dinner-table staples in most American households, 
respondents were strikingly able to produce opinions.  Just between 4 percent (on the issue of 
bilingual education, which had been in the news) and 11 percent (on replacing traditional literat-
ure with work by women and minorities) confessed that they did not know how what they 
thought about the issues in question.  Just over 10 percent were unsure how they felt about the 
role of the classics, 8 percent were not sure if great books are universal, and 7 percent had no 
opinion about modern art.  These percentages are high by the standards of such surveys: by 
comparison, just 4 percent said “don’t know” when asked if a book advocating homosexuality 
should be removed from their local public library, 3 percent were unsure if government spent 
too little or too much money on assistance for the poor, and fewer than 2 percent failed to 
express an opinion on whether gun buyers should be required to obtain police permits.  
Nonetheless, most respondents were sufficiently comfortable with the issues to express 
themselves to interviewers. 
  For all those who did respond to each question, Table 2 indicates the percentage 
choosing each of four options: “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree.”  
In each case, we report results separately for all respondents and for college graduates only.  
We look separately at the latter because we assume that controversies about higher education 
and the arts are typically more salient to college graduates than to other people.  We wondered 
if college graduates’ attitudes differed from those of other Americans and if their views were 




Table 2: Percentage Responses:  
                           
      Strongly          Strongly     
      Agree    Agree        Disagree    Disagree    N       
 
Trust faculty to choose 
what students read 
All           4.56     58.60        31.88          4.97     1482 
College grads         4.70        60.84        28.98          5.48        383 
 
Too much em- 
phasis on classics 
All           4.12         33.75        53.18          8.94        1431     
College grads          2.92        14.85       62.33       19.89          377 
 
Great books  
universal 
All         12.98        64.42       20.26          2.34        1456 
College grads       19.47      56.05        22.11          2.37          380 
 
English only   
in schools 
All           11.32      36.89      42.62          9.17        1537 
College grads       10.49      35.81        41.18      12.53          391 
 
Shame to replace  
traditional literature 
All              8.10      58.77       29.03          4.09        1419    
College grads        9.33       52.00        32.27          6.40          375       
 
Only few can     
judge art     5.87        43.32        41.43         9.38    1482 
College grads        4.35       31.46      49.10      15.09          391 
 
Modern painting 
just slapped on 
All            4.89        35.85      48.88       10.39        1473 
College grads        3.43        23.22       55.15       18.21          379 
 
Excellence in folk 
and popular art 
All        12.44       82.57         4.58         0.41        1463 
College grads       19.43        76.17          3.89         0.52          386 
       
Source . 1993 General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center.  "Don't knows" not 
included.  For exact wording of items, see Table 1.  
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  The General Public.   Responses to questions about education indicate that Americans 
are more uncertain than sharply divided with respect to the authority of the classics, the desirab-
ility of expanding the canon to admit works by authors from previously underrepresented 
groups, confidence in educators' stewardship of the curriculum, and even the contentious issue 
of English instruction in the public schools.  Most respondents were willing to "trust the judgment 
of the teachers and professors who decide what...students should be reading," but very few said 
they felt strongly about this and more than one third withheld their trust, again, however, with 
little passion.  (The General Social Survey asked this question again in 1998, and the results 
were very similar.)
18 
  Asked to respond to a provocatively worded assertion that students waste too much 
time reading the classics, just over one third rose to the bait, with most disagreeing.  Again, 
strong opinions were notable for their rarity.  Indeed, other evidence points to the fact that 
Americans are divided in their views of the importance of the classics, but not rancorously so.  
A 1998 telephone survey of registered voters found a bare majority agreeing with the statement 
that “every college student should have to study the classics of Western Civilization in order to 
graduate,” with a large minority expressing disagreement and a similarly small number of 
“strong” opinions.
19 
  Respondents were more willing to agree with a statement, also provocatively phrased, 
bemoaning the substitution of works "promoted because they are by women or by members of 
minority groups" for "traditional American literature."  Yet, even though the wording seemed cal-
culated to maximize the proportion of sympathetic responses, fewer than one in twelve strongly 
agreed, and more than one in three dissented.
20  Between 1993 and 1998, when the General 
Social Survey repeated the item, opinion shifted towards multiculturalism, with only 56 percent 
in 1998 (compared to 66 percent) of those who expressed opinions endorsing the statement, 44 DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---15--- 
 
percent disagreeing, and an unusually high proportion (15 percent) declining to answer. 
  Respondents appear more comfortable with the notion of literary universalism: More 
than three quarters agreed that "there is no `white literature,' `black literature,' or `Asian 
literature,'..." but that "the greatest books are universal in their appeal."  Just over one in ten 
endorsed this view "strongly," the largest percentage taking a "strong" position on any item.  (It 
is not clear in what measure these responses reflected aversion to the ethnic segmentation in 
literature, admiration for “great books,” or perhaps other messages that respondents found in 
the complex proposition with which they were confronted.) 
  Responses to the question about the exclusive use of English in public schools were split 
almost evenly between those who favored at least some bilingual instruction and those who 
favored English only.  Approximately 10 percent of respondents took strong positions on each 
side, more than for other questions, but still surprisingly few for an issue that had been hotly de-
bated, is linked to feelings about immigration, and has appeared on ballots in state elections. 
  Questions dealing with the arts also revealed much diversity of opinion, and relatively 
few strongly held positions.  Respondents were about evenly split between those who agreed 
and disagreed with the classically elitist position that "only a few people have the knowledge and 
ability to judge excellence in the arts."  Fewer than 6 percent were willing to endorse the 
statement strongly, however, and fewer than 10 percent opposed it strongly.  Five years later, in 
1998, opinion had shifted noticeably in the direction of populism, with 57 percent disagreeing, 
17 percent of them “strongly.”
21   
  A majority of respondents disagreed with the statement denigrating the work of modern 
painters, although two of five agreed; fewer than 5 percent strongly endorsed the negative view, 
however.
22   By 1998, opinion had turned more cosmopolitan, with just over 30 percent 
agreeing and 14 percent of respondents taking vigorous exception.
23      DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---16--- 
 
  Responses to the statement that "Artistic excellence can be found in popular and folk 
culture just as much as in the fine arts" were the most lopsided, reflecting a nearly unanimous 
rejection of the aesthetic ideology that once sharply privileged high culture.
24  Fully 95 percent of 
respondents agreed, and only six of the 1463 respondents took vigorous exception to an assert-
ion that most educated Americans would once have deemed philistine.  Nonetheless, even in 
this case, respondents were reluctant to express strong opinions, with just over 10 percent 
agreeing "strongly" with the popular stance. 
  Overall, the responses demonstrate that Americans endorse universalism and reject a 
narrowly highbrow definition of aesthetic merit by wide margins, but that they hold divergent 
opinions about virtually everything else.  Large minorities of respondents don't trust educators to 
create curricula, think that students have to read too many "classics," want English to be the only 
language of instruction in the public schools, are sympathetic to the substitution of works by 
women and people of color for "traditional American literature," believe that one must have 
special skills or abilities to judge excellence in art, and agree that "even a child" could produce 
modern painting -- with small majorities taking the opposite positions.  The pattern of responses 
implies uncertainty and tentativeness more than polarization, however, because only the hot-
button issue of English in the public schools causes even one in five respondents to take polar 
positions.  For all other items, the ratio of moderate to extreme responses ranges from 5.5:1 
(the greatest books are universal) to 7.2:1 (substituting works by women and minority-group 
members for "traditional American literature").  Most Americans, it seems, have either thought 
too little about these issues to feel comfortable with extreme positions or, if they have 
considered them, see enough merit on each side to find the extremes unappealing. 
  College Graduates.   It stands to reason that people who have graduated from col-
leges and universities are more likely to care about what goes on in them than are less educated DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---17--- 
 
Americans.  And because college graduates participate more actively in the arts than others, it 
seems reasonable that arts-related topics will engage them more deeply as well.  Consequently, 
we looked separately at the opinions of respondents who reported having graduated from 
college.  Perhaps, we thought, opinions have become polarized among the most highly 
educated, even if the rest of the public has been indifferent. 
  For the most part, the views endorsed by college graduates are similar to those of other 
Americans.  This is especially true of confidence in faculty curricular judgment, the universality of 
the great books, and, to a lesser extent, bilingual education and the expansion of the curriculum. 
 The primary difference between college graduates and respondents with fewer years of formal 
education is that the former are more willing to take strong stands in defense of traditionally 
defined high culture and in favor of cultural diversity and cultural democracy.  Thus 40 percent 
of respondents with less than college degrees, but only 15 percent of college graduates, agreed 
that the classic receive too much emphasis in U.S. education; 20 percent of college graduates – 
but just 5 percent of other respondents – disagreed strongly with this assertion.  Similarly, 
almost half the respondents without college degrees but just over one in four college graduates, 
agreed that “modern painting is just slapped on”; and more than twice as many college gradu-
ates (18 percent compared to 8 percent) took strong exception to this view.
25 
  At the same time, college graduates evinced a more democratic perspective on taste 
than other respondents.  Whereas well over half of the other respondents endorsed the 
statement that “only a few people can really appreciate great art,” only 35 percent of college 
graduates supported this view.  By contrast, twice as many college graduates (15 percent as 
compared to 7 percent) disagreed with it strongly.   And although nearly everyone endorsed the 
populist position that excellence can be found in popular and folk culture as easily as in high art, 
fully 20 percent of college graduates, as compared to fewer than half that many nongraduates, DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---18--- 
 
said that they “strongly” agreed. 
  Conclusions on Polarization.  There are three things worth noting about these 
patterns.  First, as expected, college graduates are great defenders, although not the only 
defenders, of both classical and modern high culture.  This is consistent both with the con-
ventional notion that universities inculcate respect for the arts and with arguments by such 
sociologists as Pierre Bourdieu and Randall Collins that college graduates represent a kind of 
status group committed to defending a high culture from their command of which – “cultural 
capital” in Bourdieu’s terms -- they derive much prestige.
26   Although this result seems 
overdetermined, it does suggest that we must not be too quick to believe the Cassandras who 
claim that higher education no longer instills respect for canonized art and literature.
27   We shall 
have more to say about this later. 
  Second, and more surprising, college graduates as a group evince a more democratic 
view of culture than other Americans, expressing faith in the majority’s ability to judge quality in 
the arts and refusing to draw strong qualitative boundaries between high culture and other forms. 
 This is surprising for two reasons.  If college graduates benefit from their command of 
prestigious forms of culture, it would seem to be in their interest to endorse, and to claim a 
privileged relationship with, the established cultural hierarchy.   That they fail to do so is news.  
For another thing, many scholars and journalists have depicted the United States as engulfed in 
a war over the value of established culture, with populist philistines arrayed against the de-
fenders of the classical faith.  James Hunter, for example, has written that “multiculturalists wish 
to increase the recognition, power, and legitimacy of various minority groups, in part through a 
delegitimation of an `oppressive’ mainstream American culture.”
28   For this and other reasons, 
he argues “multiculturalism undermines the authority of cultural norms and cultural institutions.”
29 
 Yet it seems that we find the same kinds of people, especially college graduates, overrepre-DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---19--- 
 
sented on both sides of the trenches.  This suggests that the opposition the high culture and 
multiculturalism be a false one.  Again, we shall have more to say about this below. 
  Third, college graduates are more likely to give emphatic responses – to report not just 
that they “agree” or “disagree” but that they do so “strongly.”   This tendency is small --- like 
other people, most college graduates hew to moderate positions -- but it is statistically 
significant for all items but two (bilingual education and trusting professors to decide on curric-
ular matters).  Only attitudes towards bilingual education --- where 10 percent strongly agree 
and 12 percent strongly disagree --- show signs of polarization.  In other cases, college 
graduates tend to choose only one of the two polar alternatives.  Thus 20 percent of college-
educated respondents disagree strongly with the proposition that students have to read too 
many classics (compared to 3 percent who strongly agreed); and almost 20 percent strongly ag-
ree that excellence can be found in folk and popular culture, compared to just over half of 1 
percent who strongly demurred from this view.  In other words, consistent with the notion that 
these issues are more salient to them, college-educated respondents are more willing to take 
strong stands on these items, but (except on the subject of bilingual education) not in a way that 
indicates that opinions are polarized.  In other words, these data suggest strongly that the 
cultural battles that have raged around academia and the arts neither reflect sharp division in the 
views of Americans (either college graduates or the general public) nor had much effect on 
those views. 
Are Attitudes Ideologically Coherent? 
Even if Americans’ views on cultural authority and cultural diversity are far from polarized, it is 
still possible that, consistent with the “culture war” story, people’s attitudes (strongly held or 
not) might cluster into coherent ideological packages.  If so, such a structure could serve as a DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---20--- 
 
scaffolding around which broad polarization might yet occur.   
  We explored this issue by looking at a matrix of correlation coefficients, statistics that 
range from –1 (if x, then not y) to 1 (if x, then always y), with 0 representing statistical 
independence (knowing x tells one nothing about y).
30  If the conservative culture critics are right 
about how the sides line up, we would anticipate the following: 
 
Not enough emphasis on      Too much emphasis on classics 
  classics          classics 
Great books are universal      No universal literature 
English only in the schools      Bilingual education 
Don’t revise the canon      Make the canon more inclusive 
Only a few can recognize good art    Anyone can recognize good art 
Modern painting is just slapped on    Modern painting is serious art 
Excellence in high culture      Excellent in all kinds of culture 
Don’t trust teachers and      Trust teachers and professors to  
  tenured radicals        decide what students read  
Traditionalists        Progressivists    DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---21--- 
 
 
Table 3: Patterns of Association Among GSS Culture Items  
(Kendall's Tau-b) 
 
Table 3a: Correlation matrix of GSS culture items for full sample  
       1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8    
1) TRSTPROF  1.000                         
2) CLASSICS   -.042  1.000              
3) GRTBOOKS    .075**   -.081**  1,000     
4) ENGLISH    .027    .080**    .019  1.000           
5) PCLIT    -.039    .006    .124**    .201**  1.000     
6) JUDGEART    .151**    .182**   -.049    .127**    .066*  1.000     
7) MODPAINT   -.110**    .238**   -.051    .201**    .170**    .113**  1.000       




Table 3b: Correlation matrix of GSS culture items for college graduates  
       1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8    
1) TRSTPROF  1.000   
2) CLASSICS   -.079  1.000            
3) GRTBOOKS    .099*   -.197**  1,000       
4) ENGLISH   -.010   -.032   -.045  1.000     
5) PCLIT     .023   -.018    .117*   .278**  1.000     
6) JUDGEART    .151**    .157**   -.054   .165**    .090*  1.000    
7) MODPAINT   -.156**    .280**   -.136*   .169**    .168**   .131*  1.000     




Table 3c: Correlation matrix of GSS culture items for respondents with no more than a 
high-school education  
       1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8    
1) TRSTPROF  1.000   
2) CLASSICS    .024  1.000            
3) GRTBOOKS    .037   -.070*  1.000   
4) ENGLISH    .059*    .119**   .011  1.000     
5) PCLIT     -.040    .004   .163**    .138**  1.000   
6) JUDGEART    .165**    .145**  -.042    .129**    .058  1.000    
7) MODPAINT   -.102*   . 162**  -.004    .201**    .142**    .090*  1.000   
8) EXCELART   -.009     .018   .152**    .065*    .230**    .027    .064*  1.000 
 
 
Source . 1993 General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center.  "Don't knows" not 
included.  Wording of items can be found in Table 1.  *=p<.05  **=p<.001.   DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---22--- 
 
  The first headline is that there is little evidence of ideological coherence of any kind.  
Correlations among items, though often statistically significant, are also quite low: The highest for 
the general public is .24.  (Where opinions are ideologically coherent, so that items essentially 
measure the same underlying world views, coefficients of .50 or greater are common.)  As it 
happens, the strongest positive correlation is between two items that are often portrayed as 
negatively associated:  People who think that schools should continue to teach the classics also 
take modern painting seriously. 
  Indeed, of twenty-eight pairwise correlations only ten were statistically significant and 
consistent with the conventional wisdom described above.   Almost as many – eight statistically 
significant associations – contradict the conventional wisdom.  (Another ten pairs of opinions 
are essentially unrelated to one another.)   In other words, the notion that solid blocks of 
ideologically unified traditionalists and progressives vie for control of our universities and cultural 
institutions, although possibly correct as a characterization of mobilized interest groups, provides 
no purchase in understanding patterns of response among a cross-section of the U.S. populat-
ion.  If in 1993 there was a culture war in progress, clearly most of the population had not 
enlisted on either side. 
  Of course, there is plenty of reason to doubt whether one should expect to find id-
eological coherence in the general public’s attitudes towards these matters.  Rather one might 
expect it to appear in the opinions of highly educated men and women for whom the issues are 
more salient.
31  Indeed, more responses were significantly associated for the college graduates 
than for those with less education, and the number of correlations consistent with the 
conventional wisdom rose from ten to thirteen (with seven continuing to contradict the 
conventional wisdom, and eight pairs still unassociated).  Degrees of association remain modest, 
but they do indicate somewhat greater ideological coherence in the opinions of more educated DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---23--- 
 
respondents. 
  Almost all of this coherence reflects significant associations among five of the eight items: 
bilingual instruction in the schools, expanding the canon to include works by women and authors 
of color, whether many people can judge excellence in art, whether excellence is as likely to be 
found in popular and folk culture as in high culture, and views of modern painting.  College 
graduates who oppose bilingual education and opening up the canon are also somewhat more 
likely than others to deride modern painting, believe that few people can judge aesthetic quality, 
and say that excellence is more easily found in high culture than in other forms.  Cultural demo-
crats -- people who think that excellence can be found in any cultural form and that most people 
can identify good art – are also more likely to favor bilingual education and expanding the 
canon, and are more willing to defend modern art.  None of these tendencies is very strong, but 
they are all sufficiently marked that one would not likely find them by chance.  
  Other patterns, however, demonstrate that the polarity that conservative critics have 
constructed is not evident in the opinions of the American public, even the college-educated 
public.  Support for the role of the classics in schools is associated not with conservatism, but 
with commitment to cultural democracy: an expansive view of how many people are qualified to 
judge art, of the excellence of folk and popular cultures, and with support for modern painting.  
Also inconsistent with the conventional wisdom is the fact that respondents who endorse two 
“traditionalist” views – a belief in literary universalism and the belief that only a few people can 
judge quality – also express more confidence in professional educators.
32 
  If the structure of opinion among the college educated affords only partial and equivocal 
support for the conventional wisdom, patterns among respondents with high school diplomas or 
less provide none at all: only eight of twenty-eight correlations are significantly consistent with 
the “culture-wars” story; nine significant associations contradict it; and eleven pairs of opinions DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---24--- 
 
are not related at all.    
  Some differences between college graduates and those who stopped schooling with 
high school are instructive.  Whereas college graduates who agree (and agree strongly) that 
excellence can be found in folk and popular art are less likely to deplore replacing traditional 
American works with multicultural fare and more likely to defend modern painting, the pattern 
for the least educated respondents is the reverse.  These and other results suggest that for 
college graduates, equating the value of popular and folk culture reflects a democratic openness 
to art and culture of many kinds.  By contrast, for the least well educated, the same equation 
appears to reflect a rejection of all cultural authority, and a devaluation of many kinds of art.  
Put another way, the most educated respondents tend to reject hierarchy in order to elevate the 
bottom, whereas the least educated tend to reject hierarchy as a means of devaluing what has 
been at the top. 
Beyond Binary Oppositions: A Multidimensional View 
We have seen that no single-dimensional explanation suffices to capture the complexity of 
Americans’ beliefs (even as these are expressed in responses to prefabricated survey questions) 
about cultural authority and cultural diversity.  In particular, the notion that conservative 
traditionalism and multicultural liberalism exhaust the space of opinions on these matters turns 
out to be especially implausible. 
  What then does explain how people respond to these items?   In order to pursue this 
question, we eliminated two of the items -– whether excellence can be found in folk and popular 
culture (because there was so little disagreement about it), and whether the great books are 
universal (because the question was confusing) --- and submitted the rest to a “factor analysis”: 
a statistical program that places items that are associated with one another into clusters and DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---25--- 
 
provides some statistical guidance in deciding how many are necessary to apprehend the 
complexity of people’s responses.
33 
  The results indicated that three distinct dimensions structure people’s responses.  These 
three dimensions are  
1. orientation to high culture (measured by attitudes towards the literary classics and modern 
art); 
2.  resistance to multiculturalism (tapped by attitudes towards bilingual education and 
expanding the literary canon); and 
3.  rejection of cultural authority (reflected in distrust of educators and the view that most 
people can judge art).
34 .    
Far from representing binary oppositions, these three dimensions tapped distinct and largely 
independent points of views.  In the statistical analyses that follow, each of these dimensions is 
measured by a scale summing each respondent’s score on the two items on which each 
dimension is based. DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---26--- 
 
Explaining attitudes 
Having identified the dimensions that appear to structure people’s attitudes towards cultural 
diversity and cultural authority, we can now begin to explain why people vary along them.  We 
use “explanation” in the special sense, limited but illuminating, common to this kind of research: 
the prediction by statistical means of a person’s position on scales representing each of the three 
dimensions.  To accomplish this, we look at many other “variables” (aspects of identity, life 
experiences, or other beliefs) on which people differ, and ask how these differences are 
associated with people’s positions on the dimensions of interest (attitudes towards high culture, 
multiculturalism, and cultural authority).  In order to distinguish between the “effects” of different 
characteristics, we use a statistical method called “multiple regression analysis” to examine each 
variable while “holding constant” effects of all the rest.  Thus we can interpret results as 
representing the difference between people who differ with respect to any given variable but are 
similar with respect to all other characteristics of which we have taken account.  The 
characteristics we use to predict the attitude measures are age, race, gender, years of formal 
education, residence in the Southeast, income, membership in a conservative Protestant religious 
denomination, and political conservatism.
35   
  In addition, we use four scales based on the addition of other separate measures.  One 
combines three items tapping support for legally sustained racial separation into a measure of 
racism (of a particularly crude variety).
36  A second scale, tolerance, is based on responses to 
fifteen questions about whether advocates of various unpopular opinions should be permitted to 
speak in public, teach in a college or have a book in the local library.
37  A third scale, confid-
ence in professional institutions, sums measures of the respondent’s confidence in education, the 
press, medicine, and the scientific community.
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several kinds of arts events and several related attitudes into a measure of commitment to the 
arts.
39    
  We shall discuss the three dimensions (our three kinds of cultural attitudes) one at a 
time.  In each case we start by examining the way in which people’s identities and experiences 
are associated with their cultural attitudes (without considering their attitudes in other domains); 
then we look at the relationship of cultural orientations to other attitudes; and finally we examine 
together the effects of those characteristics and attitudes that are associated with the 
perspective we are trying to explain, in order to see the effect of each with the others taken into 
account.  We separate the measures in this way because a strong (if not unassailable) case can 
be made that personal characteristics are causally implicated in the development of the attitudes 
they predict.  By contrast, the link between attitudes in one realm and attitudes in another is 
more logical than causal, representing affinity rather than sequence.
40  We put them together, in 
the end, in order to understand to what extent personal characteristics influence cultural attitudes 
by shaping other aspects of a person’s world view, and to what extent their influence is 
independent of the other attitudes measured here. 
  We shall focus on major findings described in broad strokes.  Readers interested in 
additional technical detail should consult Table 4, which presents results of the multiple 
regression analyses, and follow the endnotes that accompany our discussion. DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---28--- 
 
Table 4: OLS Coefficients for Predictors of GSS Cultural Attitude Measures 
 
 
Independent     HIGH CULTURE     REJECT AUTHORITY            MULTICULTURALISM 
Variable  1   2    3       1     2     3        1     2  3      
Age      -.009        -.074*    -.048     -.127**    -.116* 
 
Black   -.058*    -.034    -.007          .140**     .068   
 
Female   .091**     .049     .011          .116**     .121* 
 
Rural   -.056*     .023    -.052         -.007 
 
Hispanic  -.015        -.026          .065 
 
South     .015        -.065*    -.002     -.049 
 




Denomination  -.062*     -.039     .007          .004 
 
Education   .286**     .218**     .139**     .184**      .101**     .509** 
 
Political 
Conservatism  -.083         .029        -.253**   .340 
 
Art commitment    .259**   .181*       .064          .099 
 
Tolerance     .226**   .140*       .143*   .104        .031 
 
Confidence     .035        -.159*  -.132*       -.034 
 
Racism    -.122*  -.107*      -.087         -.178** -113* 
 
EducationX Political 




   .119   .221   .221     .033   .047   .065     .066    .136   .147 
 
N      1221    328    331     1284    332    371     1256     338    402 
 
Source.1993 General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center. For each dependent 
variable, model 1 includes demographic and attribute predictors, model 2 includes attitudinal 
scales and arts commitment only, and model 3 combines significant or near-significant variables 
from both models.  Ns vary because some questions appeared only on two ballots of the GSS, 
and some combinations of variables restricted the sample to one of three GSS ballots.  
*=significant at .05 or less; **=significant at .001 or less.  DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---29--- 
 
  Support for high culture.  Respondents who scored high on this dimension rejected 
both the notion that schools focus too heavily on classics and the dismissive characterization of 
modern art.  We expected that more educated respondents would evince more allegiance to 
high culture, because many studies have found the number of years a person has gone to school 
to be the best predictor of his or her participation in and attitudes towards high culture.
41   As 
expected, educational attainment is by far the best predictor of positive attitudes towards high 
culture among the sociodemographic variables, with an effect three times as large as that of any 
other.  Considerably smaller, but still statistically significant, differences exist in the views of 
women (more supportive) and men, between Euro-Americans (more supportive) and African-
Americans, and between people who live in rural areas (less supportive) and others.   
  Members of theologically conservative Protestant denominations are also significantly 
less supportive of high culture than others.  We initially attributed this difference to the inclusion 
in the scale of a measure of attitudes towards modern art, government support for which had 
been the target of highly publicized attacks by some evangelical leaders.  To see if we were 
correct, we separately examined predictors of the scale’s two components – view of modern 
art and position on the role of the classics in school curricula.  To our surprise, members of 
theologically conservative denominations have more negative sentiments towards the classics as 
well as towards modern art, and the size of the differences are almost identical.  Apparently, 
religious and secular conservatives part company in their view of the importance of the 
traditional works of high culture.
42 
  It was no surprise that people who attend arts events, enjoy classical music and like 
their friends to be “cultured” would rank high on this dimension, as both scales tap an underlying 
interest in the high-culture arts.  Indeed, this is the case.  What was surprising is that political 
tolerance is almost as strongly related to positive attitudes towards the classics and modern art DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---30--- 
 
as is high-cultural participation and taste.  Moreover, racist attitudes are negatively and 
significantly associated with support for traditional high culture.     When we look 
simultaneously at the effects of both personal characteristics and other attitudes on support for 
high culture, we find that differences related to gender, race, residence and religion stem from 
the fact that these characteristics shape other attitudes and behaviors – especially participation 
in high culture – that influence attitudes towards the arts directly.
43  By contrast, fully 75 percent 
of the positive effect on attitudes towards high culture of educational attainment persists even 
after we take account of the fact that more educated people attend more arts events, are more 
politically tolerant and are less likely to endorse racist views than those with less education.  
Apparently schooling succeeds in instilling respect for the value of high culture, even among 
people who do not personally participate in the arts.  (Schooling also engenders support for the 
arts because it has such a strong effect on people’s own arts participation, but that mechanism 
appears to be of secondary importance.)   
  Support for multiculturalism.  Respondents who scored high on this dimension do 
not regret the displacement of traditional male authors by women and authors of color in 
university curricula, and support the use of languages other than English in public-school 
classrooms.  We expected that education would be associated with support for multiculturalism, 
because research has shown that the highly educated tend to be cultural “omnivores,” enjoying 
many kinds of cultural forms; and because they ordinarily express lower levels of racial or ethnic 
prejudice.
44  In fact, the more educated are significantly more sympathetic to multiculturalism, as 
are women and African-Americans.
45   
  A few proponents of multiculturalism have implied that assertion of the value of trad-
itional western culture represents a thinly veiled rejection of multiculturalism, or even a distaste 
for the “cultural others” themselves.
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partial to Euro-American high culture because one likes it, not because one dislikes people who 
are not Euro-American.  At the same time, research on symbolic racism suggests that cultural 
attitudes may be extensions or displacements of intergroup antipathies, with cultural represent-
ations of a group bearing a burden of hostility otherwise directed to the group itself.
47    
  For this reason, we anticipated that the less racist the respondent, the more he or she 
would favor multiculturalism.  Indeed, racism is indeed significantly and negatively associated 
with opposition to multiculturalism.
48   
  Curiously, though, self-described political conservatism is even more strongly as-
sociated with opposition to multiculturalism than is endorsement of crudely racist positions.  
Students of racial attitudes disagree with how to interpret such results.  Some would argue that 
positions on policy issues related to cultural diversity (for example bilingual education and cur-
riculum reform) are structured by both racial views and matters of philosophical principle 
unrelated to race.  These scholars might interpret our findings as indicating that philosophical 
considerations are even more important than racial views in determining opposition to 
multiculturalism.  Other scholars contend that changes in the political landscape have let to a 
conflation of racism and conservatism --- that is, a situation in which people define themselves 
as “conservative” partly on the basis of attitudes that reflect subtle forms of racial stereotyping 
and aversion.  As declines in the proportion of Americans endorsing crudely racist positions 
have made the latter poor predictors of most policy preferences, more subtle correlates of racial 
intolerance (like “conservatism”) have picked up the explanatory slack.  In this view, then, the 
fact that conservatism and racism together explain about 15 percent of variation in people’s 
positions on the multiculturalism scale reinforces the suspicion that opposition to multicultural re-
forms is often a form of symbolic racism.
49  
  Interestingly, the effect of conservatism is significant only for the more educated re-DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---32--- 
 
spondents, and the effect of education depends upon how respondents placed themselves on 
the scale of liberalism-to-conservatism.  For self-described liberals, higher education is strongly 
associated with support for multiculturalism; for self-described conservatives, it is associated 
with opposition.  Thus it seems that education polarizes opinion by increasing the salience of 
multiculturalism, and therefore the correlation between political ideology and attitudes, for 
conservatives and liberals alike.
50    
  Rejection of cultural authority.  Respondents who score high on this final dimension 
reject the proposition that only a few people are capable of judging excellence in art and are 
reluctant to trust educators to choose what students will read in school.  One might expect that 
education would instill faith in the authority of cultural elites, by exposing people to such elites 
and also leading them to view themselves as possessing legitimate cultural authority by dint of 
their own training.  This is not the case: Consistent with the notion that the highly educated 
participate in an antinomian “culture of critical discourse” and exhibit a chronic disposition to 
question authority, formal education is actually the strongest positive predictor of rejection of 
cultural authority.
51  Older people and those living in the South are also less likely (respectively) 
to question cultural authority than the young and people in other parts of the U.S.   These effects 
are small, but sufficient to refute the claim that middle America has rejected the authority of a 
cultural establishment it views as a left-wing “cultural elite.”
52  
  We expected attitudes towards cultural authority to be related to attitudes towards 
professional authority of other kinds.  Specifically, we anticipated that people who expressed 
little confidence in physicians, scientists, journalists and educators would also have populist 
attitudes towards judgments about art and literature.  Our expectation was confirmed by a mod-
est but statistically significant association in the expected direction.   
  The most striking finding about attitudes towards cultural authority, however, is that they DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---33--- 
 
are very hard to predict: Even with both sociodemographic characteristics and attitudes 
included, the statistical model explained (that is, rendered predictable) only about one sixteenth 
of the variation in responses.  We suspect that different Americans reject authority for quite dif-
ferent reasons --- some out of grudging resentment and others out of a Whitmanesque faith in 
the capacity of the common woman or man --- and that these different motives are associated 
with very different antecedents, making them unlikely to be well predicted by a single statistical 
model. 
  Closed Minds and Tenured Radicals: Are Universities Responsible for Gen-
erational Differences in Cultural Attitudes?   The conservative critique of higher education 
asserts that there has been a generational trend towards civilizational decline (i.e., rejection of 
high culture, rejection of cultural authority and support for multiculturalism) and lays blame for 
this supposed trend at the gates of higher education.  We evaluated this argument by dividing 
our sample into three age cohorts --- pre-baby-boomers (born before 1947), baby boomers 
(born 1947-1960), and post-boomers (born between 1961 and 1975) --- and examining 
differences among them, focussing especially on people exposed to the effects of higher 
education. 
  There are actually two versions of the conservative story.  We refer to the first, 
articulated by Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind, as the theory of boomer 
exceptionalism.  In this view, things began to go wrong in the 1960, when the baby boomer 
generation seized control of America’s campuses, laying waste traditional educational values as 
cowardly liberal administrators capitulated to their demands.   If this were the case, we would 
expect to see sharp declines in support for high culture among the baby boomer generation, 
accompanied by sharp increases in support for multiculturalism and rejection of cultural 
authority.  We call the second approach tenured-radical theory, Roger Kimball set it forth in DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---34--- 
 
his book Tenured Radicals.  Not all boomers were corrupted, so the story goes, but the bad 
eggs went disproportionately into college teaching.   The diffusion of barbarism awaited their 
elevation to the tenured professorate, just in time to corrupt the values of “Generation X.”   If 
this is the case, we should see a particularly sharp decline in support for high culture, increases 
in support for multiculturalism, and greater rejection of cultural authority in the post-boomer 
cohort.  Moreover, in each case, the generational change should be greater for respondents 
who attended college than for those who were unexposed to the academic milieu. 
  Both of these accounts prove inconsistent with the evidence.  Support for high culture 
evinces no decline from one cohort to the next, and years of education predicts respect for high 
culture as well for younger as for older respondents.  Support for multiculturalism does increase 
with the boomer cohort (and it stays higher among the post-boomers); but the increase is visible 
at all levels of education, so it cannot be attributed to the effects of higher education.  (It more 
likely reflects a decline in racism as the baby boomers came of age.)  Similarly, boomers and 
post-boomers are less accepting of cultural authority than their elders but, contrary to conser-
vative criticisms, the change is actually less pronounced among those exposed to higher educat-
ion.
53  
Conclusions: Public Opinion’s Democratic Vistas 
In this final section, we shall return to the broader themes that animate this volume.   Whereas to 
this point we have been cautious in presenting and interpreting our data, in this section we shall 
take more liberties, exercise more interpretive license (even to the point of speculation), and 
address normative, as well as positive, concerns.  Our normative stance is both conservative, in 
the sense that we wish to conserve the great art and culture of the past, and democratic, in that 
we hold an inclusive understanding of the arts and culture, favor widespread diffusion of many DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---35--- 
 
cultural forms, and are reasonably optimistic about people’s capacity to make their own choices 
about culture and the arts. 
  From this normative standpoint, we find the results of this inquiry into public opinion 
encouraging for at least three reasons:  
  1. First, our analyses refute the notion that Americans (at least any sizable number of 
them) are engaged in a clash of coherent ideologies between traditionalist conservative and 
secular progressivist forces.  Neither the views of the general public as a whole nor of college 
graduates constitute the coherent packages that culture warriors of the right and (to a lesser 
extent) the left have attempted to construct.  Cultural conflicts in our schools, universities, and 
arts institutions reflect not a struggle between two well defined sets of values, but rather a set of 
loosely related contests knit together more by strategy and convenience than by common 
ideology. 
  2. The worst fears of both liberals and conservatives are largely imaginary (with respect 
to public opinion, if not necessarily with respect to organized social movements, of course).  
Liberals may take cheer in the fact that (after one controls for political conservatism and other 
factors) fundamentalists and Evangelicals are no less sympathetic to multiculturalism than other 
Americans.  And supporters of high culture (though not opponents of multiculturalism) are likely 
to be less, rather than more, racist in orientation than opponents of classics and modern art.   
For their part, conservatives may be pleased to learn that university education and generational 
change have not had the radicalizing impact attributed to them.  Other things equal, younger 
generations are no less oriented to high culture than their elders.    
  3. Third, and perhaps most encouraging, whereas conservative cultural critique 
presupposes and constructs an opposition between Euro-American high culture and the cultures 
of women and people of color --- “a culture war over the value of traditional Western civilizat-DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---36--- 
 
ion versus the works of Third World authors and thinkers” ---  it appears that most Americans 
are not buying it.
54  Support for traditionally defined high culture is driven by formal education 
and cosmopolitan values: Far from representing a form of symbolic racism, belief in the value of 
high culture is negatively associated with racism and positively associated with political toler-
ance.  By contrast, opposition to multiculturalism reflects, to some extent, symbolic racism, as 
well as more general political conservatism.  Despite the efforts of critics of cultural diversity to 
construct an opposition between traditional high culture and cultural pluralism, support for both 
is associated with high levels of formal education and racial tolerance. 
  None of this is to deny that cultural conflict exists, that activists form alliances across 
many different issues, or that social-movement elites hold more coherent ideological 
understandings of disparate issues than ordinary noncombatants.   Nor is it to deny that rhetoric 
about "culture wars," or recitation of discourses that link previously disparate issues, may 
eventually contribute to creating the very conditions they purport to describe.  Rather, it 
suggests that explanations for conflict over education and the arts must be sought not in the 
structure of public opinion, but in the specific institutional logics of these fields and in the 
strategies and tactics of mobilized social movements. 
  Indeed, given the energy that the right has poured into struggles over education and the 
arts, it is surprising that Americans' attitudes are as unpolarized  as they are.  We suspect that 
our findings provide a clue as to why efforts to foment broad-based conflict over the arts and 
education have not been more successful.  To erupt into a culture war, differences in opinion 
should both pit one form of culture against another at the symbolic level and be rooted in struct-
ural cleavage (for example, membership in identity groups or political organizations) that permit 
identities to crystallize around symbolic struggles.  Instead, we find that the strongest supporters 
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the ranks of the highly educated, and that those who support one are also likely to support the 
other.   
  Moreover, perhaps reflecting the victory of the celebrated American faith in cultural 
democracy with the rise of mass higher education, the college-educated steadfastly refuse to 
play the role of "cultural elite" into which some have tried to cast them.  Instead, higher 
education is associated not only with support for traditional culture and multiculturalism, but also 
with democratic attitudes towards cultural authority and a broad definition of aesthetic value. 
  The absence of a large constituency for cultural hierarchy would seem to indicate a sea 
change in educated opinion, given the cultural and institutional dominance of hierarchy at least 
through the 1950s. It is difficult to pinpoint the timing of that change.  It appears that at some 
point higher education stopped inculcating an exclusive version of cultural hierarchy and began 
instead to produce an openness to and appreciation of a wide range of cultural forms.  This 
change coincided with a shift in the social meaning of the arts, such that interest and participation 
in high culture became attached to an attitude complex including tolerance, social liberalism, and 
skepticism towards authority.
 55    
  It may also have marked a shift in the form of cultural reproduction from intergen-
erational transmission of a fixed hierarchy to transmission of a capacity for cultural adaptation 
and flexibility.  Whereas in past generations, prestige was mapped hierarchically onto cultural 
forms in a manner that reflected the stratification of their audiences, contemporary education im-
parts, instead, a standardized ability to display  "individualized" tastes that enact identity and 
defy categorization.  If so, the ranks of the highly educated will yield few willing conscripts to 
culture wars in higher education and the arts; and, as the stakes of such wars ultimately matter 
the most to the highly educated, even the most bellicose generals will find it difficult to raise large 
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   We suspect that this augurs well for cultural democracy, albeit cultural democracy of a 
particular kind.  However one defines it, cultural democratization first entails an expansion of 
cultural diversity, so that art forms or genres cannot be dismissed because they failed to be 
sacralized in the late 19
th century or because of their association with nonwestern or nonelite 
social groups.  Second, cultural democracy entails a rejection of narrow conceptions of cultural 
authority, so that more voices can be heard in conversations about artistic quality.   
  The cultural hierarchy that reigned in the United States for most of the 20
th century --- a 
system that associated artistic quality with nonprofit institutions created and governed by urban 
upper classes, supported by philanthropic contributions, and closely tied to university specialties 
--- provided a neat but flawed solution to the problem of defining and expanding access to 
excellence in the arts: “neat,” because it sustained a lot of good art in ways that the market 
could not; “flawed” because it embedded definitions of excellence in the status culture and 
identities of the upper classes upon whom high-cultural institutions relied for leadership and 
support.  The institutions of that system remain largely intact; but the system’s ideological 
erosion can be witnessed in the near unanimity with which Americans refuse to view excellence 
as limited, or even more easily found, in high culture than in popular or folk art; and in the large 
plurality of the most educated Americans who regard the ability to identify excellence as 
widespread.  The challenge is to nurture institutions that are consistent with this more democratic 
ethos.  The challenge is not to eliminate cultural distinction, but to establish a basis for identifying 
and promulgating excellence that is independent of class, race, and gender --- in other words to 
liberate artistic hierarchies from social-structural constraints.  Thus stated, this a utopian vision.  
The practical question is: how closely an actually existing society can approximate it? 
  In addressing this question, it is important to recognize that each of the constructs with 
which this chapter is concerned – cultural authority and cultural diversity – comes in two very DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---39--- 
 
different forms.  As we have seen, some people reject cultural authority because they reject 
many kind of culture: this nihilistic antinomianism is associated with rejecting both traditional 
high culture and multiculturalism.  By contrast, higher education appears to inculcate in many 
Americans an expansive antinomianism, an inclination to reject artificial distinctions in order to 
affirm the value of many genres and cultural traditions.   
  Likewise, there is more than one route to cultural diversity.  One approach, favored by 
classical cultural democrats, is collaborative and deliberative: Communities come together to 
celebrate their many strands, schools expose children to the wealth of cultures to which they 
have access, and artists and writers from different traditions share their work and even 
collaborate around common projects.  We see examples of this in the French experiment with 
cultural animation, in community arts projects throughout urban and rural America, and in some 
programs in the schools.
56  The other route, theorized less but practiced much more, is through 
the market: As technological change permits narrow-casting, commercial enterprises can bring 
to market many more types of culture, tailored to the tastes of ever smaller audiences, thus 
fostering both diversity and innovation.  The classic example here is the field of music, where the 
massive changes engendered by digitalization are transforming the economic logic of the music 
industry virtually overnight.  
  With respect to cultural authority, expansive antinomianism is clearly superior on 
normative grounds to its nihilistic alternative.  With respect to cultural diversity, the normative 
conclusions are less clear.  The collaborative approach to diversity is deeper and more inclusive: 
it permits cultural critique in which many voices can be heard and underlying assumptions can be 
made explicated.  But it is also very labor-intensive (and therefore expensive, either in 
contributed time or in philanthropic donations), and is therefore unlikely to occur except during 
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  By contrast, the market has provided an extraordinarily efficient means of implementing 
cultural diversity (and, indirectly, by sidestepping institutions congruent with the existing cultural 
hierarchy, in fostering democracy), but the market is a risky ally.  For one thing, whether 
markets foster diversity and excellence, or hierarchy and monoculture, depends upon the details 
of industry structure, technology, and the incentive structures the latter produce.  In large part 
due to the effects of the internet and digitalization of cultural products, the market is a source of 
abundance today, but we cannot count on it remaining so in the future.  Typically, new 
technologies have unleashed innovation and diversity, which is ultimately limited by the efforts of 
oligopolistic competitors to control markets and maintain stable revenue flows --- efforts that 
have typically limited diversity.
57  Moreover, market-fostered diversity presents a risk of 
fragmentation: cultural democracy requires not just diversity, but mutual awareness and respect; 
by contrast, emerging marketing practices reinforce segmentation of taste cultures.
58   
  In considering the prospects, it may be useful to consider the way the differing approach 
to authority and diversity might intersect.   Nihilistic antinomianism is clearly destructive.  Tied 
to collaborative cultural action, it leads to repression rather than democracy.  Articulated to 
market forces, it is conducive to the mass culture of which the Frankfurt School warned us.    
  By contrast, the expansive approach to authority --- increased faith in the aesthetic 
capacity of regular men and women, a willingness to find excellence in many genres --- is an 
indispensable ingredient in cultural democracy.  Associated with a collaborative approach to 
diversity, it provides the ingredients for cultural animation --- an integration of art and literature 
into ongoing efforts at community development and change.
59   Associated with the market 
version of diversity, it offers a means to overcome the danger of fragmentation: a faith in the 
active intelligence of consumers and in their willingness and ability to cross boundaries and 
exercise critical discrimination in many realms.    DiMaggio and Bryson: Cultural Diversity and Cultural Authority ---41--- 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Table 5: Authority, Diversity, and Democracy 
                 Authority 
          Nihilistic    Expansive 
 
    Collaborative    Censorship    Cultural animation 
Diversity 
    Market     Mass culture    Inclusive differentiation 
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----- 
  We believe that public sentiments provide a basis to realize some of the promise of 
cultural democracy --- “a program of culture, drawn out, not for a single class alone, or for the 
parlors or lecture rooms, but with an eye to practical life…a scope generous enough to include 
the widest human area...eligible to the uses of the high average of men -- and not restricted to 
conditions ineligible to the masses,” as Whitman described it at the moment that the United 
States’ urban elites were actively constructing a hierarchical culture of limited permeability.
60  To 
be sure, nihilistic antinomianism, opposed both to high culture and to multiculturalism, retains a 
constituency, but it would appear to be dwindling.  Instead, the sentiments of the typical 
educated Americans --- the ones with the most to say about cultural policy and educational 
practice, and the ones whose consumer decision drive the cultural marketplace --- combine a 
persistent respect for high culture with a curiosity and openness to new forms; a belief in critical 
standards but a skepticism as to their application; a cosmopolitan openness to the cultural other 
and a persistent inclination to invest in conventionally defined cultural capital.   
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cultural democracy, at least so long as low barriers to entry permit many producers to offer a 
wide range of materials.  Indeed, given the persistent respect for high culture evinced by 
Americans who reject the ideology that privileges high culture and the judgments of critics and 
curators, it appears that conservative traditionalists have had too little faith in the inherent value 
and appeal of the objects of their veneration.  At the same time, there are many types of culture 
– and, even more, ways of apprehending cultural objects – that could not persist, or would 
persist much less widely and effectively, without the existing framework of philanthropically 
supported nonprofit organizations, and without continued public and philanthropic investment in 
institutions of collaborative diversity and cultural animation.  Moreover, without public policy to 
ensure that barriers to entry in cultural industries remain low, the liberating potential of the 
market will not be realized.  The key is to find the mix of policies, public and philanthropic, that 
can guide and manage the new cultural marketplace in ways consistent with the new sensibilities 
that structure the public’s understanding of culture and its relationship to it. 
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